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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a determination by the Dis-
trict Court that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal 
from a decision of the Utah Transportation Commission that 
two outdoor advertising signs owned by Appellant were ille-
gally erected and would be removed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Second District Court, the Honorable J. Duffy 
Palmer, Judge, dismissed Appellant's appeal for the reason 
that the appeal was not timely filed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a ruling of this Court affirming 
the decision of the District Court. 
STATE~~NT OF FACTS 
A hearing was held before Commissioner Charles 
Ward of the Utah Transportation Commission in December of 1971 
as to the status of two outdoor advertising signs owned by Ap-
pellant. On September 16, 19 77, the Transportation Commissior 
issued its findings, conclusions, and decision in the matter, 
finding that the signs were unlawful and ordering that they 
be removed. Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal, 
dated October 20, 1977, with the Second District Court, also 
requesting a trial de novo in the matter. Respondent fileda 
motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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Following oral argument and the submission of memoranda of 
points of law by both parties, the District Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on January 24, 1978, dismissing 
the appeal because it was not timely filed. The present ap-
peal to this Court followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT 
LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR APPELLANT'S 
APPEAL IN THIS MATTER, BECAUSE APPELLANT'S 
NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED MORE THAN 30 
DAYS AFTER THE DECISION OF THE STATE TRANS-
PORTATION CQr-lMISSION IN THE ~iATTER, CONTRARY 
TO SECTION 27-12-136.9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AS AMENDED. 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, a section of the Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act, provides that the owner of an illegal out-
door advertising sign may request an administrative hearing 
before the Utah Transportation Commission, "to show cause 
why the sign should not be removed." An appeal may be taken 
from the Commission's determination, as further provided in 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9: 
The decision of the commission may be appealed 
to the district court in the county in which 
the sign is located. The court shall sustain 
the decision of the commission if it is sup-
ported by substantial evidence as shown by the 
records, exhibits and transcripts. If there 
is no appeal from the commission's decision or 
if the commission's decision is affirmed, the 
sign owner, landowner, or occupant of the land 
shall be liable for all costs incurred by the 
- 2 -
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commission, including the transcript fees. 
Appeals shall be taken within 30 days of the 
commission's decision by filing a notice of 
appeal and senctlng a copy of the notice to 
the commission. (emphasis added) . 
The statute clearly indicates that the deadline fc 
filing an appeal from a decision of the Commission falls 
thirty days from the decision, not thirty days from the re-
ceipt of the notice of decision by the appellant. The statu-
tory language is unambiguous, and is therefore not susceptibl 
to statutory construction or interpretation aimed at making 
it say what it does not. Appellant has conceded that its 
notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the 
Commission's decision in the matter (Appellant's Brief, page 
and that it received notice of the Commission's decision well 
within the thirty-day period, that is, "nearly 14 days from 
the date of the decision ... " (Appellant's Brief, page 7). 
Failure to file a notice of appeal in a timely manner is a 
jurisdictional defect, and the District Court correctly rulec 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant's appeal in thE 
matter. 
Decisions of this court have repeatedly approved 
the principle that deadlines for initiating appellate review 
are not mere technicalities which may be ignored by the cour: 
and that the failure to meet such deadlines is a j urisdictio' 
defect which will result in dismissal of t.he attempted appea 
- 3 -
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For example, in Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 
P.2d 845 (1955), an appeal fron a denial to vacate a contempt 
order was dismissed, because the notice of appeal was not filed 
with the district court until one day beyond the one-month 
limit for notice of appeal which applied in that case. In re 
Estate of Ratliff, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967), this 
Court declined to entertain an appeal from a denial of a 
motion for new trial, because the proper filing fee was not 
paid within the one-month deadline, and therefore the appeal 
was not timely filed. Similarly, in Watson v. Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973), the Court refused to hear 
an appeal from a denial of motion for new trial where the 
appeal was not timely filed. In unlawful detainer actions, 
the Court has also refused to hear appeals filed after the 
ten-day period set by statute for such filing& e.g., Coombs 
v. Johnson, 26 Utah 2d 8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971); Vickery v. 
Kaiser, 556 P.2d 502 (Utah, 1976). 
Courts in numerous other jurisdictions have recog-
nized the principle that failure to comply with the time 
limit for filing an appeal is a fatal jurisdictional flaw, 
and have ruled that this principle applies with equal force 
to appeals from determinations of administrative bodies. For 
example, in Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control, 153 Cal App. 2d 523, 314 P.2d 1007 (1957), 
cert. den. 356 u.s. 902, 78 s.ct. 562 (1958), the Court ruled 
- 4 -
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that a state appeals board had no jurisdiction to review an 
administrative decision where the appeal was mailed one day 
beyond the statutory forty-day period allowed for taking 
such an appeal. The Court stated: 
The general policy of our law is not unfa-
vorable to judicial review of administrative 
proceedings. But it is the policy of our 
law that time limits for filing notices of 
appeal in all legal proceedings must be 
complied with literally and exactly. This 
is generally held to be a jurisdictional 
prerequisite. (Citations omitted). 
This court can see no reason why appeals in 
administrative tribunals should be governed 
by any other rule. 
Id. at 1009. * 
In Butler v. Insurance Department, 6 Ore.App. 241, 487 P. 2d 
103 (1971), the court similarly denied the petitioner's right' 
to judicial review of an administrative determination, for 
failure to file a petition for review within the statutory 
sixty-day period. In Varnes v. Lentz, 30 Ill.App. 3d 806, 
332 N.E. 2d 639, 642-3 (1975), the Court stated that the 3~& 
* Another holding of the Hollywood Circle case, that a sectic 
of the California Code of Civil Procedure dealing with ser-
vice by mail did not apply to administrative proceedings, 
was subsequently overturned in Pesce v. Department of Ale~ 
Beverage Control 51 Cal. 2d 310, 333 P.2d 15, 17 (1958). H 
ever, neither the Pesce case, nor any other case of which 
Respondent is aware, questioned the policy and language of 
the Hollywood Circle case cited above. 
- 5 -
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limit for notice of appeal from an administrative determina-
tion provided for in the Illinois Administrative Review Act 
was jurisdictional, that parties could not stipulate otherwise, 
and that the appellant's complaint, filed beyond that time 
limit, could not be heard. In Williams v. City of Kirkwood, 
537 S.W. 2d 571 (Mo.App., 1976), where the plaintiffs were not 
allowed judicial review of the administrative granting of a 
permit because they failed to comply with a thirty-day filing 
requirement, the court approvingly cited the following language: 
The right of appeal is purely statutory and 
courts may not enlarge the period in which 
notice is required. Such timely notice is a pre-
requisite to jurisdiction. Id. at 574-5, 
citing Lafayette Federal Savings & Loan 
Association of Greater St. Lou1s v. Koontz, 
516 S.W. 2d 502, 504 (Mo.App. 1974). 
Thus, numerous cases in this and other jurisdic-
tions have recognized that courts may not assume appellate 
jurisdiction, where jurisdictional requirements set out by 
statute have not been complied with. Similarly, in the present 
case, the right to appeal from a determination of the Utah 
Transportation Commission is statutory and precisely the same 
result should obtain. Appellant has cited no authority from 
this jurisdiction or any other in which an appeal from an 
administrative hearing has been allowed where the appealing 
party failed to fulfill the jurisdictional requirements of the 
- 6 -
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statute which created the right of appeal. Nor has Appellant 
suggested any other valid reason why the clear requirement of 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 that notice be filed within thirty days of 
the Commission's decision should be disregarded. 
Appellant argues that the thirty-day period should 
begin upon notice, despite the clear statutory directive of 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 that the period begins at the time of the 
Commission's decision. Appellant concedes that "Appellant's 
appeal would have been late" if the language of U.C.A. 27-12-
136.9 means \vhat it says (Appellant's Brief, page 3), but 
attempts to circumvent this by applying Rule 73(h) of the Ut~· 
Rules of Civil Procedure to this case by means of the Commis-
sion's purported adoption by regulation of Rule 8l(d). This 
argument is specious for a number of reasons: ( 1) Utah Trans· 
portation Department Regulation A-88-30-1: 14c, cited by Appel· 
lant, applies only to the filing of the notice of appeal with 
the Commission, not with the District Court. The regulation 
also expressly reaffirms the statutory mandate that notice to 
the Commission shall be made within thirty days of the decisior 
(2) Rule 8l(d) states that provisions of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure apply in appealing from any order of an admin-
istrative agency, "except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal ... is in conflict 
or inconsistent with these Rules." (emphasis added) . Even 
- 7 -
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assuming arguendo that the Rules of Civil Procedure would 
allow thirty days from the day of notice for an appeal to be 
filed, this would be inconsistent with U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, and 
therefore would not apply. (3) Further assuming arguendo 
that the Commission regulation may somehow be construed as al-
lowing notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after 
the notice of decision is received, such a regulation would 
be contrary to statute and would therefore be void. Further-
more, no regulation of the Utah Transportation Commission 
could have the effect of granting or withholding appellate 
jurisdiction to a District Court in contravention of statutory 
prerequisites, nor does this regulation purport to do so. 
Appellant indicates in its Brief that, in Respon-
dent's memorandum to the District Court, "it is conceded that 
where the Rules of Civil Procedure do apply, that Rule 73(h) is 
that rule ... " (Appellant's Brief, page 4). This is not strictly 
accurate. Respondent's basic argument in its earlier memorandum, 
as in this Brief, was that U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 sets the time in 
which an appeal of this kind may be taken, and that no Rule of 
Civil Procedure supercedes that statutory limit. Respondent 
merely argued that Rule 73(h) would be more apposite than Rule 
73(a) as to the question of Appellant's alleged excusable neg-
lect, "even assuming arguendo that some one of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure applies in this situation .... " (Memorandum in 
- 8 -
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support of Plaintiff-Respondent's Hot ion to Dismiss, page 4). 
Finally, Appellant in its Brief states that "it is 
entirely possible" that a so-called restrictive reading of 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 may at some time result in an individual's 
not being advised of the Commission's decision until his righ· 
to appeal had run. That, however, is not the case currently 
before this Court. Respondent avers and the District Court 
agreed, that notice of the decision was given to Appellant 
well within the thirty-day limit, and that Appellant could ha·. 
filed a timely notice of appeal upon the exercise of reasonab: 
diligence. Respondent respectfully submits that this Court 
must rule on the basis of the facts before it, not on the basi 
of the uncertain and totally speculative eventuality posited 
by Appellant. 
In short, Appellant failed to meet the jurisdiction' 
prerequisite of filing a notice of appeal "within thirt.y days 
of the Commission's decision," U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, and there-
fore the District Court was correct in dismissing the Appeal. 
POINT II 
ASSUHING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS 
NOT BARRED, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A 
TRIAL DE NOVO IN THE tffiTTER. 
In its Notice of Appeal, Appellant requested that 
the District Court grant a trail de novo in the matter. In 
paragraph 2 of its motion to dismiss, Respondent requested 
- 9 -
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that the District Court issue an order that Appellant was not 
entitled to a trail de novo, in the event that the appeal was 
not barred. Counsel for Respondent argued the point at the 
District Court hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. In its 
Hemorandum Decision granting the Hotion to Dismiss, the Dis-
trict Court made "no ruling as to whether or not under a proper 
case a trial de novo should not be ordered." Nevertheless, in 
the event that this Court finds that Appellant's appeal is not 
barred, and in the interest of judicial economy, Respondent 
respectfully prays this Court to rule that Appellant is not 
entitled to a trial de novo. 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 states that the District Court 
shall sustain the decision of the commission 
if it is supported by substantial evidence as 
shown by the records, exhibits and transcriPts. 
(emphasis added). 
Regarding revie\.,r of a com:nission decision on illegal outdoor 
advertising, that section also states: 
The commission shall forward its records, ex-
hibits and transcripts to the district court 
having jurisdiction within 30 days after receiv-
ing notice of such appeal. 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.9 clearly contemplates only appellate review 
of the records, exhibits, and transcripts of the administra-
tive hearing, and not a trial de novo by the District Court. 
In light of the statutory language, Respondent submits that 
such a ruling would be proper for guidance of the District 
- 10 -
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Court on remand, if this Court finds the appeal to have been 
improperly barred by the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has failed to meet the thirty-day juris· 
dictional requirement of U.C.A. 27-12-136.9, and has suggest~ 
no valid reason why the requirment should be ignored in this 
case, or why, in the event an appeal were granted, Appellant 
would be entitled to a trial de novo. Respondent therefore 
prays that the order of the District Court dismissing Appel-
lant's appeal be affirmed, or if it is not affirmed, that 
this Court issue a ruling that Appellant is not entitled to 
a trial de novo. 
DATED this ~day of May, 1978. 
~~~ STEPENJ. SRENSON Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
This is to certify that two copies of the forego-
ing Respondent's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Stephen M. Harmsen, Attorney for Appellant, 350 South 400 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this ,JL/0- day of May, 1978. 
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